Wage Growth and Job Mobility in the Early Career : Testing a Statistical Discrimination Model of the Gender Wage Gap by Belley, Philippe et al.
Wage Growth and Job Mobility in the Early Career :
Testing a Statistical Discrimination Model of the Gender
Wage Gap
Philippe Belley, Nathalie Havet, Guy Lacroix
To cite this version:
Philippe Belley, Nathalie Havet, Guy Lacroix. Wage Growth and Job Mobility in the Early
Career : Testing a Statistical Discrimination Model of the Gender Wage Gap. Working paper
GATE 2012-29. 2012. <halshs-00735742>
HAL Id: halshs-00735742
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00735742
Submitted on 26 Sep 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
GROUPE	  D’ANALYSE	  ET	  DE	  THÉORIE	  ÉCONOMIQUE	  	  LYON	  -­‐	  ST	  ÉTIENNE	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
W	  P	  1229	  
 
 
Wage	  Growth	  and	  Job	  Mobility	  in	  the	  Early	  Career:	  
Testing	  a	  Statistical	  Discrimination	  Model	  	  
of	  the	  Gender	  Wage	  Gap	  
	  
	  
Philippe	  Belley,	  Nathalie	  Havet,	  	  Guy	  Lacroix	  
	  
	  
September	  2012	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
D
oc
um
en
ts
	  d
e	  
tr
av
ai
l	  |
	  W
or
ki
ng
	  P
ap
er
s	  
Wage Growth and Job Mobility in the Early Career: Testing a
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Abstract
The paper focuses on the early career patterns of young male and female workers. It inves-
tigates potential dynamic links between statistical discrimination, mobility, tenure and wage
profiles. The model assumes that it is more costly for an employer to assess female workers’
productivity and that the noise/signal ratio tapers off more rapidly for male workers. These
two assumptions yield numerous theoretical predictions pertaining to gender wage gaps. These
predictions are tested using data from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth. As predicted by our statistical discrimination model, we find that men and women
have the same wage at the start of their career, but that female wages grow at a slower rate,
creating a gender wage gap. Also consistent with our model, we find that mean wages are
higher for workers who keep their job, while wage growth is stronger for workers who change
job.
Keywords: Gender wage gap, job transitions, tenure, returns to mobility, experience
JEL codes: J16, J71, J41
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1. Introduction
Economic analysis has made numerous contributions to our understanding of the causes of
occupational segregation and the existence of earnings disparities between men and women
on the labor market.1 In particular, several theories of discrimination have attempted to
explain why two groups with identical average productivity are paid different average wages.
They have attributed differences to either employers’ prejudices, i.e. taste discrimination
[Becker (1957)], or imperfect information, i.e. statistical discrimination [Phelps (1972); Arrow
(1973)]. However, all of these theories in their earliest and simplest version are not supported
by empirical evidence. Models built on taste discrimination predict the elimination of the
male/female differential in the long run, whereas their persistency has been observed for
decades in most OECD countries. Models based on statistical discrimination have proved
deceptive since they were unable to generate a gender/racial gap in mean wages.
Consequently, second generation models have been developed to go beyond the strict op-
position between discrimination and productivity differentials. For example, recent models
of taste discrimination integrate henceforth the dynamic of job-search costs [Flabbi (2010);
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002); Rosen (2003); Black (1995); Sattinger (1996); Sasaki (1999);
Sulis (2011)] and obtain more interesting conclusions in the long term. Nevertheless, these
models are always little helpful in understanding gender discrimination as they fail to explain
the root of the prejudices. In contrast to taste-based theories of discrimination, statistical
discrimination theories derive group inequality without assuming gender animus or preference
bias against members of a targeted group. Models of statistical discrimination are more ap-
pealing because they suggest gender discrimination may be a rational response by firms to
imperfect information on individual productivity.
While all models of statistical discrimination share that feature, there exist important differ-
ences which suggest different explanations for group inequality. Two principal paths in this
literature have been followed. The first one, based on Arrow (1973), examines how asymmet-
ric beliefs (true or not) about different groups can influence hiring decisions or wages. Recent
models of this kind combine dynamic job assignment models with human capital assumptions.
They explain wage differentials as well as promotions [Lazear and Rosen (1990); Barron et al.
(1993)] and their long term persistency [Coate and Loury (1993); Moro and Norman (2004);
1For a literature review, see Cain (1986) and, more recently, Altonji and Blank (1999) and Havet (2004)
and for statistical discrimination, see Fang and Moro (2011).
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Moro (2003); Fryer (2007)].
The second path followed in the field of statistical discrimination originates directly from the
pioneer work of Phelps (1972). It is based on the notion that employers are unable to precisely
know the productivity of each employee insofar as the signals available to them (recruitment
tests, diplomas, etc.) are less reliable for women than for men. Recent work has thus
extended Phelps’s seminal contribution by introducing human capital investment decisions
[Lundberg and Startz (1983); Havet and Sofer (2008)] or by accounting for job matching
[Rothschild and Stiglitz (1982); Oettinger (1996)]. In both cases, it turns out wage gaps
arise endogenously.
This paper focuses on the early career patterns of young male and female workers. In order
to achieve a better understanding of the overall gender wage gap, it seems to be of crucial
importance to understand the factors contributing to the gender differential in early-career
wage growth. Indeed, we empirically observe that the gender wage gap is fairly small at the
entry into the labour market, but after a few years a considerable gender wage gap emerges
[Loprest (1992); Manning and Swaffield (2008); Napari (2009); Del Bono and Vuri (2011)].
Consequently, investigating the determinants of gender wage gap in the early career could
help understand the growing male-female wage gap over the course of the worker’s career.
Moreover, focusing on career starts is particularly interesting since some of the common
explanations for gender wage gap are irrelevant at this stage. For example, male and female
workers differ fairly little in terms of career interruptions and thus gender wage gap cannot be
convincingly explained by gender differences in promotion opportunities (glass ceillings) given
the short durations of jobs and the small experience of young workers. By contrast, models
of job mobility, which point to the heterogeneity in the quality of employee-employer matches
[Burdett (1978); Jovanovic (1979)] could be relevant. There is evidence that mobility plays
a less important role in terms of wage growth for young women: not only are young women
less likely to quit a job, but they also seem to receive lower returns to mobility than young
men [Simpson (1990); Light and Ureta (1992); Loprest (1992)].
Therefore, our paper seeks to illustrate potential links between statistical discrimination, mo-
bility, tenure and wage profiles. We use the statistical discrimination model proposed by
Oettinger (1996) to explain racial wage gaps as our starting point. Thus a worker’s produc-
tivity is assumed to depend on the quality of the job match. It is further assumed that it is
more costly for an employer to assess female workers’ productivity. Finally, the model allows
productivity to become less noisy with tenure. As in Altonji and Pierret (2001) and Altonji
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(2005), we assume that employers learn about workers’ characteristics and productivity over
time. However, unlike Oettinger (1996), we assume that female workers’ productivity remains
noisy with tenure, while male workers’ noise/signal ratio is assumed to be zero in the second
period of their two-period lives.
Oettinger (1996) conjectured that even if asymmetries and informational imperfections were
only transient, they could nevertheless generate permanent wage differentials between racial
groups. By assuming away perfect productivity revelation for women, our model does indeed
show that gender wage gaps may appear within the first years of the working lives and may
be permanent. Furthermore, the model provides a simple framework within which gender
differences in terms of tenure, experience and mobility can be better understood.
The model generates a series of predictions that we test against U.S. data from the 1979
cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. It turns out most theoretical predictions
are supported by the data. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure
of the model and its basic assumptions. Section 3 presents the wage profiles that characterize
the equilibrium and emphasizes theoretical implications with respect to gender differences
in mobility. Finally, Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2. The Structure of the Model
Our approach is based on the dynamic statistical discrimination model setup by Oettinger
(1996), which incorporates the notion of job-matching. In particular, like Oettinger, we as-
sume that the productivity of any job match is imperfectly observed ex ante, that the initial
productivity signal is noisier for the “minority” group (i.e. women in the present paper) and
that additional information about the productivity of the match is revealed with tenure on the
job. Our contribution is to extend Oettinger’s framework by allowing for the possibility that
match productivity is not revealed completely for women as job tenure accumulates and con-
sequently female workers’ productivity remains less reliable. It turns out that this simple gen-
eralization substantially expands the set of empirical predictions with respect to male-female
differences in starting wages, wage levels for experienced workers and wage growth.
In our model, the agents are competitive firms who negotiate compensation with employees
one-on-one and offer each a wage equal to his or her expected productivity, conditional upon
all available information, and income-maximizing workers who take mobility decisions based
3
on their expected wage schedules. Before we describe the agent’s objective functions and
determine the equilibrium, it is essential to precise the informational context in which firms
make their wage decisions.
Employees are assumed to work for two periods (t = 1, 2) and maximize expected com-
pensation over their working lives. At the beginning of each period t, a worker receives
exactly one job offer. The true productivity of an employee in the job offered at period
t, µti , is a random variable whose distribution is known and identical for men and women:
µti ∼ N
(
µ¯i , σ
2
µi
)
.
Individuals’ productivity depends on the quality of their job match. Moreover, for each in-
dividual, the true quality of the new job offers received in the two periods, µ1i and µ2i ,
are independent draws from the underlying match productivity distribution. This latter as-
sumption, standard in Jovanovic (1979) ensures that employees’ history is irrelevant to the
evaluation of his/her productivity in any newly formed match.
The quality of the match is vulnerable to informational imperfections on both sides of the
market. Productivity is ex ante unknown in any potential, but untested, match. Before the
match actually occurs, employers and employees alike do not know precisely what the exact
productivity will be. It can only be ascertained by observing employee i in the job offered at t.
More precisely, during the first period all workers will be employed in the job they were offered
at the beginning of the period. Let the observed productivity of worker i be given by:
s j1i = µ1i + ε
j
1i , where ε
j
1i ∼ N
(
0, σ2εj
)
, j ∈ {f ,m} , (1)
and where superscripts f and m stand for female and male workers, respectively. We assume
that µ1i and ε1i are not correlated. At the start of the second period, the worker must decide
whether to stay on the job or move to a new job. If the new offer is accepted, both parties
will observe the productivity in the new match with error, as in the first job, i.e.
s j2i = µ2i + ε
j
2i , where ε
j
2i ∼ N
(
0, σ2εj
)
, j ∈ {f ,m} . (2)
If the worker stays in the first-period job, his/her true productivity remains µ1i , since our
model assumes away investment in human capital. On the other hand, the two parties will
better assess the true productivity, µ1i . For stayers we may write observed second-period
productivity as:
s ′j1i = µ1i + v
j
i , where v
j
i ∼ N
(
0, σ2v j
)
and σ2v j < σ
2
εj , j ∈ {f ,m}. (3)
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As in Phelps (1972), gender differences occur essentially through the quality of the productivity
signal, i.e. σ2
εf
> σ2εm . We further assume that a gap remains irrespective of tenure. This
assumption departs from Oettinger (1996) who assumed that the noise/signal ratio vanished
after the first period. In fact we assume this to be the case for men, but not for women, i.e.
0 = σ2vm < σ
2
v f
.
The gender difference in the individual productivity uncertainty has often been justified on
cultural grounds [Cornell and Welch (1996); Lazear (1999)]. For example, Henley (1977) and
Lang (1986) stress that men and women differ in their communication style and therefore
the evaluation process is subject to greater “error” if the candidate is a woman, given that
employers and managers are disproportionately men. In the same spirit, Montgomery (1991)
shows formally that information about the least represented group in the top-level jobs is
usually of lower quality. Recently, Altonji (2005) has argued that unemployment is likely to
interact with early statistical discrimination to deter employers’ learning. To the extent women
typically suffer from higher unemployment then men, they may be less able to convey their
true productivity. For all these reasons it seems legitimate to assume that gender differences
in the measurement of individual productivity arises not only at the time of hire, but also
during employment.
Formally we assume that firms are competitive and risk-neutral, negotiating employee com-
pensation on an individual basis. Employers will offer wages equal to individual expected
productivity due to the binding zero expected profits in both periods. In the first period, wage
profiles can thus be written as:
w j1i = E
(
µ1i
∣∣∣s j1i ) , j ∈ {f ,m}. (4)
Likewise, second-period wage contracts are determined by individuals’ productivity signal, i.e.
s ′j1i if individual i remains on the job, and s
j
2i otherwise. We thus have w
j
2i = E(µ1i |s ′j1i) for
“stayers” and w j2i = E(µ2i |s j2i) for “movers”. A worker will choose to change jobs if, and
only if, the expected wage in the second-period job offer exceeds the expected wage in the
current job, that is if µˆj2i ≡ E
(
µ2i
∣∣∣s j2i ) > µ˜j1i ≡ E(µ1i ∣∣∣s ′j1i ) . Wages in the second period
can thus be written
w j2i =
{
µ˜j1i , if µ˜
j
1i = E
(
µ1i
∣∣∣s ′j1i ) ≥ µˆj2i = E(µ2i ∣∣∣s j2i ) (stayer),
µˆj2i , if µ˜
j
1i < µˆ
j
2i (mover).
(5)
Note that the productivity of a male stayer will be perfectly observed. His compensation will
be wm2i = µ˜
m
1i = µ1i and the condition to remain on his original job is µˆ
m
2i ≤ µ˜1i . Naturally
5
these conditions do not apply to female workers. We will now examine the equilibrium solution
and analyze how gender wage gaps may arise.
3. Equilibrium Wage Profiles
Equilibrium is determined by the optimization behavior of employers and employees. Firms,
which are in a competitive environment, maximize profits by proposing wages, which reflect
expected productivity conditional on the individual signal and the group membership. Workers
take mobility decisions that maximize their expected lifetime earnings. We will characterize
wage profiles in the two periods before drawing conclusions about the returns of mobility,
tenure, and experience.
3.1. First-Period Wages
For the first period, our analytical framework is identical to the initial statistical discrimination
model developed by Phelps (1972) and Aigner and Cain (1977). We obtain the standard result
according to which wage contracts are a weighted average of mean productivity (µ¯) and of
the individual signal, s j1i :
w j1i = E(µ1i |s j1i) = (1− ρ2j )µ¯+ ρ2j s j1i , j ∈ {f ,m}, (6)
where ρ2j = σ
2
µ/
(
σ2µ + σ
2
εj
)
.2
The weight ρ2j can be interpreted as a measure of the quality of the signal. Thus the greater
the reliability of the signal, the more employers will individualize wage rates. Clearly, given the
assumption that women’s signals are less reliable,3 employers will discriminate —rationally—
between men and women by offering them different wages. When setting the starting wage
of women, they will tend to emphasize the average characteristics of the group over individual
performance in order to guard against possible measurement errors. Consequently, men and
women with the same productivity signals, s1, will receive different compensations. Women
with a strong initial signal will receive a lower pay than their male counterparts, and conversely
for a weak productivity signal. The wage profile offered to women during the first period is
thus less steep than that offered to men, and women’s compensation is more clustered around
2To show this, observe that µ1i and s
j
1i are normal bivariates with correlation coefficient ρ
2
j = σ
2
µ/
`
σ2µ + σ
2
εj
´
.
The result follows from computing the conditional expectation.
3The assumption σ2εm < σ
2
εf implies ρ
2
f < ρ
2
m.
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mean productivity, µ¯. Men’s wages will in fact have a higher variance
(
ρ2mσ
2
µ
)
than women’s(
ρ2f σ
2
µ
)
. Yet, men and women will receive the same wage rate upon entry into the labor
market. Indeed, expected pay in the first period is invariant with respect to the reliability of
the signals
E
(
w j1i
)
= µ¯, j ∈ {f ,m} , ∀ρ2j . (7)
Thus first period mean wages are equal to mean productivity, which we assume identical
across gender.
3.2. Second-Period Wages
Second period wage profiles depend on mobility behavior. As shown previously, stayers’ wage
rates are characterized by w j2i = µ˜
j
1i = E
(
µ1i
∣∣∣s ′j1i ) and those of the movers by w j2i = µˆj2i =
E
(
µ2i
∣∣∣s j2i ). A worker continues with the same job only if µ˜j1i ≥ µˆj2i and conversely changes
jobs if µ˜j1i < µˆ
j
2i . Because mobility is endogenous, non-random selection between movers and
stayers must be accounted for when characterizing mean compensation. Thus,
• the average second-period wage is given by:
E
[
µ˜j1i
∣∣∣ µ˜j1i − µˆj2i ≥ 0] = µ¯+ δ2j√
δ2j + ρ
2
j
(
2σ2µ
pi
)1/2
, j ∈ {f ,m} (8)
for stayers.
• and
E
[
µˆj2i
∣∣∣ µˆj2i − µ˜j1i > 0] = µ¯+ ρ2j√
δ2j + ρ
2
j
(
2σ2µ
pi
)1/2
, j ∈ {f ,m} (9)
for movers,
where δ2j = σ
2
µ/(σ
2
µ + σ
2
v j
). For stayers, δ2j is a measure of the quality of the signal similar to
ρ2j in the first period.
4 Moreover, since the productivity revelation mechanism is perfect for
men (σ2vm = 0) but imperfect for women (σ
2
v f
> 0), we have 1 = δ2m > δ
2
f . Note that the
mean conditional wage rate in the second period is equal to the worker’s mean productivity
(µ¯), adjusted for the quality of the signal. The expected wage of a mover is lower than that
of a stayer
(
ρ2j < δ
2
j because σ
2
v < σ
2
ε
)
.
4Their wage profile is w j2i = (1− δ2j )µ¯+ δ2j s ′j1i
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Our model generates positive returns to work experience and tenure. At the beginning of
the second period, a mover has one period of experience as an asset, but no tenure, whereas
a stayer has both one period of experience and one period of tenure. Thus movers’ mean
wage differential between the first and the second period characterizes the average return
to experience, while the average return to tenure is given by the second-period mean wage
differential between stayers and movers. Average returns to experience and tenure are thus
given respectively by:
ρ2j√
δ2j + ρ
2
j
(
2σ2µ
pi
)1/2
and
δ2j − ρ2j√
δ2j + ρ
2
j
(
2σ2µ
pi
)1/2
.
The positive return to tenure captures the fact that the signal is less noisy in the second period.
The unconditional second-period mean wage of group j can be derived from equations (8)
and (9):
E(w j2i) = Pr
(
µ˜j1i ≥ µˆj2i
)
E
[
µ˜j1i
∣∣∣ µ˜j1i − µˆj2i ≥ 0]
+ Pr
(
µˆj2i > µ˜
j
1i
)
E
[
µˆj2i
∣∣∣ µˆj2i − µ˜j1i < 0]
= µ¯+
[
(δ2j + ρ
2
j )σ
2
µ
2pi
]1/2
, j ∈ {f ,m} . (10)
Thus on average workers earn more in the second period because they self-select into the
best possible match. Unlike first-period wage rate, second-period wages increase with the
reliability of the signals, δ2j and ρ
2
j . The better they are, the more profitable the selection
process is likely to be on average. Indeed, mistakes such as changing jobs that prove to be a
worse match, or foregoing a job change that would have been profitable can be better avoided
when productivity signals are more precise.
In this context, male workers should benefit more from mobility. In the second period they
should on average receive higher wages than their female co-workers. Our model thus predicts
that even if there is no gender wage gap at entry into the labor market, it will appear as careers
unfold.
3.3. Wages and Mobility
We now consider between-period wage changes. The expected wage change for stayers is given
by E
[
µ˜j1i − µˆj1i
∣∣∣ µ˜j1i − µˆj2i ≥ 0] while that of movers is given by E [ µˆj2i − µˆj1i ∣∣∣ µˆj2i − µ˜j1i > 0] .
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It can easily be shown that
E
[
µ˜j1i − µˆj1i
∣∣∣ µ˜j1i − µˆj2i ≥ 0] = δ2j
(
1− ρ2j
)
√
δ2j + ρ
2
j
(
2σ2µ
pi
)1/2
, (11)
E
[
µˆj2i − µˆj1i
∣∣∣ µˆj2i − µ˜j1i > 0] = ρ2j
(
1 + δ2j
)
√
δ2j + ρ
2
j
(
2σ2µ
pi
)1/2
. (12)
From equations (11) and (12) it is clear that the expected wage change is positive for both
stayers and movers. This result is not surprising since mobility is endogenous. If σ2ε <
σ2µ —a reasonable assumption— movers will clearly experience greater wage increases than
stayers on average. Indeed wage changes for stayers solely reflect corrections to productivity
measurement errors. Conversely, wage changes are essentially attributable to productivity
changes in the case of movers.
In summary, our model yields many unambiguous theoretical predictions that can be empirically
tested. For both sexes we find that:
1. wage profiles are increasing, on average;
2. experience and tenure show positive returns;
3. movers’ mean wage is lower than that of stayers. But
4. their wage growth is greater (assuming that σ2ε < σ
2
µ).
As for the male-female wage gap, several results emerge:
1. for identical productivity signals, employers offer compensations that differ across gen-
der;
2. upon entry into the labor market, men and women earn the same wage on average;
3. however, a gender wage gap emerges in the initial years of their working lives.
Some of these predictions are similar to those derived by Oettinger (1996). In fact, the
equilibrium described by Oettinger (1996) is a special case of our model in which δ2j =
1, ∀j . However, this assumption is not innocuous since the productivity revelation mechanism
plays an important role in the determination of the second period wage rate. Moreover, our
generalization complicates the analysis with respect to differences in the return to mobility
and tenure, and changes a number of conclusions. For instance, unlike Oettinger (1996),
we cannot assert that women should always have higher returns to tenure than men because
the reliability of the initial signals
(
ρ2j
)
and the precision of the revelation mechanism
(
δ2j
)
9
act in opposite directions. Likewise, the impact of δ2j on movers’ mean wage increase is
ambiguous.
3.4. Male-Female Gap in the Return to Mobility
The analysis of gender differences in terms of return to job mobility and tenure is slightly
more complex. However, we will show that the sign of these differences not only depends on
the male-female gap in the reliability of the initial signals, but also on the magnitude of the
variances of the shocks
(
σ2
εf
, σ2
v f
)
relative to the variance of the productivity
(
σ2µ
)
.
To ease the derivation of the results let k ∈ ]0, 1] be such that σ2εm = kσ2εf , α =
σ2
εf
σ2µ
, and
β =
σ2
vf
σ2µ
. We can rewrite the conditions pertaining to the gender differences in job mobility
and tenure in terms of k , α and β. Thus for the average wage of male stayers to be higher to
that of female stayers, it is necessary and sufficient according to equation (8) that:5
1√
1 + ρ2m
≥ δ
2
f√
δ2f + ρ
2
f
, or equivalently that k ≥ kA = α− β (3 + α+ β)
α[1 + β (3 + α+ β)]
. (13)
By the same reasoning, we can derive the following predictions based on equations (8),(9),(11)
and (12):6
1. Among the stayers, men’s average wage will be higher than women’s if kA ≤ k ≤ 1;
2. Among the movers, men’s average wage will be higher than women’s if 0 ≤ k ≤ kB;
3. For male stayers to experience greater wage growth, it must be the case that kC ≤ k ≤
1;
5Recall that Oettinger (1996)’s model implicitly assumes that: σ2v f = 0 and thus that β = 0 in our
framework. His model thus boils down to assuming that k = 1, i.e. that women’s productivity signal is no
more noisy than men’s signal. Consequently his model precludes male stayers to have a higher mean average
wage.
6The expressions for kB, kC , and kE are respectively:
kB =
−3(1 + β) +
p
9(1 + β)2 + 4(1 + α)(1 + β)(2 + α+ β)− 8(1 + β)2
2α(1 + β)
,
kC =
3α+
p
9α2 + 8[(1 + α)(1 + β)(2 + α+ β)− α2]
2[(1 + α)(1 + β)(2 + α+ β)− α2] ,
kE =
(α− β)[3α− 3β +
p
9(α− β)2 + 8[(1 + α)(1 + β)(2 + α+ β)− (α− β)2]
2α[(1 + α)(1 + β)(2 + α+ β)− (α− β)2] .
The derivation of kB, kC and kE is available from the authors.
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4. The condition for the male movers’ wage growth to exceed that of female movers always
obtains;
5. Men’s return to tenure will be higher than women’s if kE ≤ k ≤ 1.
Ranking these various threshold values of k would allow us to characterize a limited number of
baseline cases. The complexity of kA, kB, kC , and kE is such that we must turn to numerical
simulation. However, if we make the reasonable assumption that the residual variances (σ2
εf
,
σ2
v f
) are much smaller than the variance of productivity (σ2µ), then α will be comprised in the
interval [0, 1], and β in [0, α] due to the manner in which productivity gets less noisy with job
tenure7. It can be shown that (kA−kE), (kE−kC), (kE−kB) are always negative irrespective
of α and β, while (kB − kC) can be both positive or negative. Consequently only six baseline
cases need be examined. Our model’s predictions are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Male-female differences in the return to job mobility and tenure
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
0 ≤ k ≤ kA kA ≤ k ≤ kE kE ≤ k ≤ kB kB ≤ k ≤ kC kC ≤ k ≤ kB kC ≤ k ≤ 1
Mean Wages in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of
of stayers women men men men men men
Mean Wages in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of
of movers men men men women men women
Return to in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of
Tenure women women men men men men
Mean-Wage in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of
Gain, stayers women women women women men men
Mean-Wage in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of in favor of
Gain, movers men men men men men men
Contrary to Oettinger (1996), our results depend on the discrepancy in the reliability of men’s
and women’s signals. In Oettinger (1996), productivity revelation is perfect, i.e. σ2
v f
= 0,
implying β = 0. This assumption has important repercussions for the threshold values. In
fact, for β = 0 we find that kA = kB = kC = kE = 1. Consequently, whatever the value of
k ∈]0, 1], we find that k ≤ kA. Furthermore, we can show that the predictions in Oettinger
(1996) correspond to the first column of Table 1. Recall that his model yielded a positive
gap in men’s returns to mobility, and that tenure was more highly valued by women.
An empirical study based on wage equations will allow us to distinguish between the differences
in the returns of job mobility and tenure for men and women. We can then establish whether
the data are consistent with any of our theoretical predictions.
7σ2εf ≥ σ2v implies that β ≤ α.
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4. Data and Empirical Analysis
4.1. The Sample
In this section, we test the unambiguous predictions of our statistical discrimination model and
focus on the theoretical ambiguities surrounding differences in the returns to job mobility and
tenure. In particular, the analysis will attempt to shed some light on how the wage gap evolves
in the earliest stages of work and on the importance of job mobility in the process.
To test the theory, we use data drawn from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY). This survey follows a cohort representative of young Americans aged
14 to 21 in 1979. It provides extensive longitudinal data on educational achievements, wages,
and work experience from 1979 to 2008. In this study we focus on white individuals from
the cross-sectional sample of the NLSY and exclude the supplemental sample of economically
disadvantaged whites.
Our aim is to follow the evolution of wages at the beginning of young adults’ career. Since our
model does not include labor supply, we follow Oettinger (1996) by focusing on an individual’s
first observable transition from weak to strong labor force attachment. Respondents are
considered to be strongly attached to the labor force during a specific survey year if they
worked at least half of all weeks since the last survey,8 and if they worked at least an average
of 30 hours during each of those weeks. The onset of a respondent’s career is the first of
three consecutive survey years of strong labor force attachment that follow one year of weak
labor force attachment.9 We then follow each respondent’s wage evolution for up to ten
years following that first transition into strong labor force attachment, keeping in our sample
only wage observations preceded by a year of strong labor force attachment.10 Consistent
with our requirement of measuring wages every year, we do not consider NLSY data collected
after 1994 since surveys were then conducted every two years.
Wage is measured at the end of each year of strong labor force attachment.11 We use hourly
8The number of weeks between each survey is not necessarily 52 weeks, so we restrict our sample to
respondents-survey years with 45 to 59 weeks since the last survey.
9Respondents who are observed to have strong labor force attachment in survey year 1979 are excluded
from the sample.
10We also experimented with a sample that excluded individuals who experienced one year of weak labor
force attachment after their first three years of strong attachment. This results in a much smaller sample,
larger standard errors, but qualitatively similar results.
11Ideally we would have identified the respondent’s “first job” and the wage associated with that job.
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wage for a job held at the time of the survey. If a respondent holds more than one job at the
time of the survey, we use the hourly wage for the job at which the respondent worked most
hours. Wages are measured in 2004 dollars and included in the sample if they are greater
than $1 and less than $60.
Educational achievements is measured using years of completed schooling. We focus on
individuals who have completed at least 13 years of education at the end of their career’s first
year. The rationale is that our model assumes male and female workers to have the same
level of commitment to the labor market. This assumption is more likely to hold in a sample
of individuals who have invested in post-secondary education. The sample of individuals with
no post-secondary education may display greater variation in their attachment to the labor
force, and the mechanisms behind this variation likely differ between men and women given
that women’s educational and labor supply choices are affected by their fertility decisions.
Although fertility decisions also affect female workers with post-secondary decisions, it can
be argued that higher household earnings and stronger investments in human capital of more
educated couples reduce the scope for fertility decisions affecting female labor supply.
The model has strong predictions about the impact of work experience, job tenure, and job
changes on wages. Work experience is a variable that counts the number of year of strong
labor force attachment since the first transition into strong attachment. Job tenure measures
the number of consecutive weeks at a given job. To identify a job change, we compare the
week when the currently held job started, to the week when the previous survey interview took
place. If the currently held job started after the previous survey, a respondent is considered
to have changed jobs.
Our model makes it clear that job changes are triggered if workers receive large shocks to
their productivity signals, or if they get good productivity draws with another employer. These
productivity draws and signal shocks are observed by the worker, but not by the econometri-
cian, and are incorporated in the error term of our wage equation. This error term is therefore
correlated with any explanatory variable describing job changes or job tenure. These variables
are instrumented using lagged job changes, lagged job tenure, and lagged annual hours of
However, the NLSY provides no question or variable referring to an individual’s first job. Many respondents
hold jobs while enrolled in school, but these may not be jobs associated with their eventual careers. Other
respondents may be out of school and hold jobs, but are not strongly attached to the labor market. This
makes it hard to identify the first job associated with their eventual career and we opted instead to look at
hourly wage for jobs held at the end of each year of strong labor force attachment.
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work. We used lagged values because our model assumes that productivity draws and signal
shocks are not correlated across periods. The first two instruments should be correlated with
current job changes and tenure through other factors not correlated with the worker’s own
wage, such as shocks to household structure, or a stronger preference for job mobility. Lagged
hours of work should identify job changes triggered by adjustment on the labor supply margin,
rather than wages.
To proxy ability, our regressions include the score percentile of the Armed Force Qualification
Test (AFQT).12 This variable is meant to capture the fact that employers may partly observe
the worker’s ability and adjust compensation accordingly. We also include a dummy variable
that controls for whether the job is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, acknowl-
edging the fact that other external mechanisms may determine wages. In the same vein we
include dummy variables for occupation and industry to reflect how work in these different
professions and firms are rewarded in the product market.13
Our sample consists of 505 women, and 474 men with at least some college whom we
observe a year following their first transition into strong labor force attachment. Table 2
provides summary statistics on some of the variables used in the empirical analysis. It shows
the distribution of the year during which workers made their transition into strong labor force
attachment. For 90% of the sample, this first transition took place in years 1980 to 1988.
On average these workers made their first transition into the labor force at the age of 23,
which is consistent with the fact that they completed on average 15 years of education.
Almost 57% of the sample had completed 4 years or more of college by the time of their first
transition.
At the end of the first year of strong labor force attachment, women and men earn an average
hourly wage rate of $12 and $13, respectively. Two years later, their respective average hourly
wage rate has increased to $14 and $16. As many as 72% of men and 67% for women change
12The AFQT score aggregates results for tests on word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mathematics
knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning. The AFQT is a subset of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
administered to NLSY respondents in 1980. At that time, age varied from 15 to 22 among respondents, it is
known that performance on the AFQT test is positively correlated with age at time of the test. We therefore
use AFQT test scores adjusted for age at the time of the test.
13Previous research has shown that occupations and industries are coded with error in the NLSY. We ignore
any industry change that is not associated with a job change. Occupation is allowed to change without any
job change. However, we ignore any occupation “cycling” within the same job: if an occupation change is
observed within the same job, it is ignored if the occupation at this same job is observed to have changed
again at the next survey interview.
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job at the end of their first year of employment. But mobility decreases as their careers unfold,
down to about 30% for men and women by the end of the third year. By that time, 14% of
male and female workers are covered by a collective agreement.
Labor supply during that first year of strong labor force attachment is quite similar for men
and women. Indeed, men worked on average 1,950 hours over 46 weeks, while women worked
1,800 hours over 45 weeks. Two years on, labor supply is slightly higher for workers of both
genders.
After their first year of strong attachment, the majority of women are either professionals
(36%) or clerical workers (30%). Two years on, both occupations are still the most prevalent
at 43% and 26%, respectively. Early on, men are more likely to work as professionals (37%)
or service workers (11%) and managers (11%). Two years on, they are mostly professionals
(38%), managers (13%), and sales workers (11%).
The two most prevalent industries for women are professional and related services (39%) and
in wholesale or retail trade (21%). Two years on, these two industries represent respectively
38% and 19% of all jobs. Male workers work mostly in wholesale and retail trade, manufac-
turing and professional services industry (20% each). Two years on, the professional service
industry represents 19% while manufacturing’s share is higher (24%).
4.2. Estimation Results
We test our model’s predictions using reduced-form log-wage regressions. Our sample includes
all individuals that have completed at least three years of strong labor force attachment
following one year of weak labor attachment. We follow their hourly wage over those first
three years of strong labor force attachment, but we also add to our sample hourly wages
observed after a year of strong labor force attachment over the next seven years. Our sample
of individual-wage observations contains real wages (in 2004 dollars) from 1980 to 1994.
4.2.1. The Gender Wage Gap
The main results concerning the gender wage gap are presented in Table 3. All results
presented in Table 3 are OLS estimates. The first column contains results for a model where
we only control for gender, age, years of education, AFQT, and a dummy variable for collective
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bargaining.14 This column shows that female wages are about 8.3% lower than that of men,
and that this gender wage gap is statistically significant. Since there is no control for work
experience, age is associated with strong wage growth. As expected, years of education,
AFQT and collective bargaining are associated with higher wages.
Models 2 to 4 gradually add more variables to the model and allows us to study how that
affects the gender wage gap. In Model 2 we add a variable for work experience, which is
measured by years of strong labor force attachment. As expected years of experience are
associated with strong wage growth: 4.2% for each year of strong labor force attachment.
Even after adding years of experience, we still find that women earn on average 8.3% less per
hour of work.
In Model 3 we add an interaction term between work experience and the gender dummy
variable. Remember that the model predicts that male and female workers have the same
starting wage, and that the lower quality of productivity signaling for women implies that
female wage should grow at a slower rate. Consistent with this, we find that the gender wage
gap is reduced to less than 2% and is not statistically significant. Moreover, the parameter on
the interaction between gender and work experience also reveals that wage growth is weaker
for women: one year of strong labor force attachment leads to a 3.4% wage growth, compared
to 4.9% for men, and this difference is statistically significant.15
Other mechanisms could generate weaker wage growth for women. If most women in our
sample expect to have children and therefore make fewer on-the-job human capital invest-
ments, we should observe weaker wage growth for women. In Model 4, we include variables
that control for marital status and the presence of children at home. The dummy variable
for being married and its interaction with gender indicate that being married is associated
with higher wages, but much less so for women. The parameter on a dummy variable for the
presence of at least one child in the household indicates that having children is associated
with lower wages.16 Including these household related variables show that the gap in wage
14Although we do not present the results here, we also include in all models a set of dummy variables to
account for occupation and industry.
15These results are consistent with Loprest (1992) who uses the NLSY79 to find that women have weaker
wage growth than men. Although she also considers a sample of workers with consecutive years of strong
labor force attachment, her sample contains workers who did not go to college. If we consider workers of all
educational levels we still find that returns to experience are lower for women, however this difference is not
statistically different once marital and parental status are accounted for, variables that are not considered in
Loprest (1992).
16We also tried adding an interaction term between gender and the child dummy variable to Model 4. We
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growth from strong labor force attachment decreases, but remains statistically significant at
1%, compared to 1.5% in Model 3. It suggests that part of the weaker female wage growth
may be explained by different on-the-job human capital investments.
4.2.2. Job Changes and Job Tenure
Our model also has predictions regarding the comparative wages of workers who keep the same
job (stayers) and those who change job (movers). We test these predictions in Table 4. The
first column reports the results of Model 3 from Table 3 where it was found that controlling
for years of experience resulted in a statistically insignificant gender wage gap. Models 5 to
7 are 2SLS estimates. As explained in Section 4.1, job changes, and by construction job
tenure, are endogenous variables. We instrument them with their own lagged values, as well
as lagged hours of work.
Model 5 of Table 4 adds a dummy variable indicating whether the individual changed job since
the last survey interview. We also include an interaction between gender and job change. Our
results show that movers have on average lower wages, as predicted by our model (see Section
3.3). Moreover, the mover wage penalty is greater for women, indicating that the mean wage
of movers is greater for men. Note also that the coefficient on gender is now positive and
statistically significant, indicating that, among stayers, women have a higher mean wage.
Stronger mean wage for women among stayers, and stronger mean wage for men among
movers is consistent with Case 1 of Table 1.
The coefficients associated with job changes in Model 5 of Table 4 are quite large. It is very
likely that these job changes are not all voluntary. Individuals who, in the high unemployment
rates of the early 1980s, suffered from layoffs, but remained in strong labor force attachment
(a requirement of our sample selection), may have done so by taking on a job (or multiple
jobs) that offered lower wages. Our results suggest that this might have been more severe
for women. Compounding all of this is the fact that we use lagged job change variables as
instruments. These may tend to identify the negative impact of job losses over multiple years
on the wages of workers who nevertheless remain in strong labor force attachment. However,
it should be kept in mind that these are log hourly wage regressions, so that measured in
actual dollars, the impact of job changes represent small amounts.17
found both the child dummy variable and its interaction with gender to be negative, but not statistically
significant.
17For example, the intercept of Model 5 in Table 4 implies a base hourly wage of $4.58, relative to an
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Model 6 includes a linear and quadratic term in job tenure weeks, as well as interactions
between these terms and gender.18 Tenure coefficients indicate that wages grow with tenure,
as predicted by our model. Moreover, this growth is significantly stronger for women, which
is also consistent with Case 1 of Table 1 which predicts larger returns to tenure for women.
These coefficients on job tenure imply that 52 weeks with the same employer lead to 4.1%
wage growth for men, compared to 7.5% for women.
Model 6 in Table 4 also suggests that women suffer from a marginally statistically significant
wage penalty of approximately 5%. This is probably due to the fact that workers with very
low tenure include those who changed jobs. These movers, and especially female movers,
suffer from severe wage penalties as shown in Model 5, and the assumed quadratic impact
of job tenure is not flexible enough to allow for this nonlinear impact of tenure. The gender
dummy variable may therefore be picking up the larger penalty of job changes for women.
With Model 7 in Table 4 we study the joint impact of job changes and tenure. We still find
that workers suffer from changing jobs, although the effect is not statistically significant for
men (this result remains consistent with Case 1 of Table 1). Tenure is still associated with
statistically significant wage growth, but we find no stronger returns to tenure for women,
contrary to Model 6.19 Finally, we find that female stayers have higher average wage, which
is consistent with Model 5 and Case 1 of Table 1.
4.2.3. Wage Growth and Job Changes
A clear prediction of the model from Section 3.3 is that although movers’ mean wage is
lower than that of stayers, their wage growth is stronger. To test this prediction, as well as
predictions about the mean wage gain across genders of stayers and movers (last two rows of
Table 1), we study wage growth in Table 5. The dependent variable is the difference between
the current log hourly wage and the log wage recorded at the previous survey. All regressions
presented in Table 5 control for collective bargaining coverage, occupation and industry.20 All
average wage of $16.68 in that regression sample. The coefficients for job change variables imply that the
base hourly wage of movers is around $3.52 for men and $1.78 for women.
18The quadratic term in tenure is divided by 10,000 for the sake of presentation. This should be kept in
mind when interpreting the value of its coefficient.
19We also experimented with linear as well as quadratic terms in tenure (as in Model 6) but all were
imprecisely estimated. We therefore opted for the more parsimonious Model 7 with no quadratic term.
20We include dummy variables for all possible state transitions. For example, collective bargaining includes a
dummy variable for individuals who stayed covered by a collective agreement, a dummy variable for individuals
who lost their coverage, and a dummy variable for individuals who gained collective bargaining agreement,
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regressions also control for age, years of schooling, ability as measured by the AFQT score
percentile, as well as a dummy variable for gender. Model 8 shows that, consistent with our
previous findings in Table 3, women have weaker wage growth, although the coefficient is
not precisely estimated. However, once we control for hours of work in Model 9, the impact
of gender is marginally statistically significant and in favor of men. Hours of work can be
seen as controls for the amount of on-the-job human capital investment, and are associated
with statistically significant stronger wage growth. Comparing the gender gap in wage growth
from Model 8 to 9 indicates that women can make up for their noisier productivity signals
through on-the-job investments.
One clear prediction of Section 3.3 is that movers should experience stronger wage growth.
Model 9 tests this prediction by adding a dummy variable indicating whether the worker holds
a job he was not holding at the previous interview. As previously explained, this variable is
endogenous. Because we are now estimating wage growth equations, where lagged hourly
wage are part of the dependent variable, we instrument job change variables with second
order lags of job changes and hours worked. The coefficient on job change is positive and
statistically significant, which is consistent with the prediction of our model that movers should
have stronger wage growth relative to stayers. Model 11 includes an interaction between job
change and gender to test among movers and stayers which gender has stronger mean wage
gains. The results are inconclusive as the parameter estimate is not statistically different from
zero.
4.2.4. Implications for Signal Quality and Productivity Revelation Across Genders
Our empirical results support Case 1 of Table 1. This has implications for the comparison
across genders of signal quality in a new job, and the productivity revelation for workers who
do not change job. These matters because they are the source of wage growth and job
mobility in our model.
Assuming that productivity revelation is perfect for men, Case 1 entails that signal quality in a
new job is good for men. For women signal quality is bad but productivity revelation is good.21
This implies that only women with very low productivity or bad post-hiring noise do not keep
leaving those who remained uncovered as the base case.
21Remember from section 3.4 that Case 1 implies k < kA, where k decreases as the signal quality increases
for men, while kA increases as the signal quality for women weakens, and as the revelation mechanism for
women improves.
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their current job. This tends to remove the extreme left part of the signal distribution among
female stayers, increasing their observed average wage. The average wage of male stayers also
increases but to a smaller extent because employers do not revise their expectations about
their productivity so much as they do for women. Contrary to women, the majority of male
movers are not drawn only from extreme left tail of the signal distribution because of their
lower noise/signal ratio. It follows that male workers move only if they get a much better
draw (productivity and noise wise) at a new job, implying that among movers, men have the
largest average wage, whereas women have a higher average wage then men among stayers.
Estimates from Model 5 of Table 4 lend support to these conjectures: women stayers have
higher wage (coefficient on dummy for gender is positive and statistically significant) while
male movers earn on average more than female stayers (the interaction between gender and
job change dummy variables is negative and statistically significant).
Wage gains from staying at the same job depends solely on the improvement in signalling
stemming from holding on to a job. The conditions that lead to Case 1 implies that this
improvement is stronger for women, with the results that returns to tenure are stronger for
women as found in Model 6 of Table 4. This also implies that wage growth among stayers
should be stronger for women, but Models 10 and 11 in Table 5 are inconclusive on this issue.
The two models are also inconclusive with regards to the predicted stronger movers wage
growth among men. Wage gains for movers depend on the quality of signalling at new jobs
but also on the revelation mechanism, which are both stronger for men.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the gender wage gap using a two-period model based on the
theories of matching and statistical discrimination. Simply by assuming that women’s true
productivity is more costly to measure, and that the noisiness of women’s signal tapers off
less rapidly than men’s, it is possible to generate a series of theoretical predictions about wage
gaps. These pertain to the relation between wage gaps and mobility, tenure and experience.
To our knowledge, only three other papers [Oettinger (1996); Neumark (1999); Altonji and
Pierret (2001)] have empirically tested the validity of the theory of statistical discrimination
within a similar framework.
The theoretical predictions are tested using U.S. data from the 1979 cohort of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The data supports most of these predictions. We find that,
though men and women with post-secondary education earn identical wages upon entry into
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the labor market, a substantial gap emerges in men’s favor in the next few years. Other clear
predictions of the model are supported: work experience and tenure are associated with higher
wages. Average wages are higher among workers who do not change job (stayers), while job
changers (movers) experience stronger wage growth.
The theoretical model has ambiguous predictions about gender-related mean wage among
stayers, mean wage among movers, returns to tenure, mean wage gains among stayers,
and mean wage gains of movers. However, the model provides enough structure to limit
its predictions to six possible cases, which we present in Table 1. Although our results are
inconclusive with regards to mean wages gains, we find evidence that supports Case 1 whereby
women have stronger mean wages among stayers and stronger returns to tenure, while men
have stronger mean wages among movers. Case 1 implies that employers are better at
inferring the productivity of new male employees, while finding it much more difficult to do so
with female employees. However, Case 1 also implies that employers eventually get a precise
estimate of female workers’ productivity with tenure.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Men Women
Entry Year and Age
Before 1983 23.0% 26.7%
1983 12.2% 14.7%
1984 14.8% 16.4%
1985 14.6% 15.3%
1986 13.5% 10.3%
After 1986 21.9% 16.6%
Age 23.2 22.8
Entry Education
Years of Education 15.4 15.2
At Least 16 Years of Education 56.3% 57.2%
Wage, Job Change, Job Tenure, Collective Bargaining
After First Year
Hourly Wage (2004 $) 12.96 11.67
Job Change 71.5% 67.4%
Job Tenure (Weeks) 52.0 53.3
Collective Bargaining 10.7% 11.7%
After Third Year
Hourly Wage (2004 $) 16.32 13.81
Changed Job 29.5% 29.6%
Job Tenure (Weeks) 109.2 106.6
Collective Bargaining 13.6% 14.1%
Labor Supply
After First Year
Weeks Worked 45.6 45.3
Hours Worked 1,956 1,803
After Third Year
Weeks Worked 50.7 50.3
Hours Worked 2,305 2,131
Sample includes white men and women who are observed transitioning from one
year of weak labor force attachment (LFA) to three consecutive years of strong
LFA, and who had completed at least one year of college by the end of their first
year of strong LFA. The definition of strong LFA is provided in section 4.1. The
entry year is the survey year during which the individual is observed having
completed their first year of strong LFA.
Table 3: The Gender Wage Gap and Work Experience
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 1.1794 1.4314 1.3911 1.3898
(0.0670) (0.0706) (0.0712) (0.0713)
Female -0.0831 -0.0830 -0.0157 -0.0002
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0207) (0.0210)
Experience 0.0419 0.0492 0.0444
(0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0038)
Experience × Female -0.0153 -0.0098
(0.0039) (0.0041)
Age 0.0405 0.0150 0.0153 0.0163
(0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Years of Education 0.0196 0.0354 0.0351 0.0329
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
AFQT Percentile 0.0024 0.0024 0.0025 0.0024
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Collective Bargaining 0.0786 0.0814 0.0794 0.0798
(0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159)
Married 0.1034
(0.0167)
Married × Female -0.0946
(0.0217)
Children (= 1 for 1+ child) -0.0499
(0.0153)
Sample Size 5,848 5,705 5,705 5,705
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Job Changes and Job Tenure
Variables Model 3 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intercept 1.3911 1.5209 1.3634 1.4430
(0.0712) (0.1310) (0.0741) (0.1478)
Female -0.0157 0.2934 -0.0514 0.3317
(0.0207) (0.1316) (0.0292) (0.1639)
Experience 0.0492 0.0441 0.0389 0.0423
(0.0037) (0.0080) (0.0044) (0.0079)
Experience × Female -0.0153 -0.0461 -0.0225 -0.0479
(0.0039) (0.0135) (0.0053) (0.0132)
Job Change -0.2633 -0.1516
(0.1416) (0.1765)
Job Change × Female -0.6790 -0.7715
(0.2880) (0.3534)
Job Tenure 0.0008 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0001)
(Job Tenure)2 (/10,000) -0.0093
(0.0036)
Job Tenure × Female 0.0007 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0002)
(Job Tenure)2 × Female (/10,000) -0.0089
(0.0055)
Age 0.0153 0.0076 0.0129 0.0071
(0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0035)
Years of Education 0.0351 0.0464 0.0392 0.0486
(0.0041) (0.0062) (0.0042) (0.0064)
AFQT Percentile 0.0025 0.0020 0.0023 0.0020
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Collective Bargaining 0.0794 0.0321 0.0647 0.0294
(0.0159) (0.0212) (0.0164) (0.0212)
Sample Size 5,705 5,217 5,184 5,184
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Wage Growth and Job Changes
Variables Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Intercept 0.1509 0.0512 -0.1369 -0.1320
(0.0521) (0.0632) (0.1065) (0.1069)
Female -0.0042 -0.0100 -0.0034 -0.0170
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0074) (0.0267)
Hours of Work 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
(Hours of Work)2(/10,000) -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Job Change 0.4265 0.3817
(0.1893) (0.2023)
Job Change × Female 0.0782
(0.1465)
Age -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0027 -0.0025
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Years of Education 0.0029 0.0046 0.0017 0.0011
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0030)
AFQT Percentile 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Sample Size 4,887 4,887 4,282 4,282
Standard errors in parentheses.
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